Abstract. Most of existing field programmable gate array (FPGA) based watermarking algorithms have two primary weaknesses, large overhead and robustness. In this work, a robust low-overhead watermarking algorithm is proposed for intellectual property (IP) protection. The ownership is split into orderly small watermarks. The watermark positions are generated by the watermarks. Location mapping is performed to each position to make it not leak in verification. The real content of embedded watermarks is compressed to be one third of the original number. The configuration of small watermark has left lots of space for correcting. So, it can locate the attackers by checking each watermark. The experimental results illustrate a low-overhead on resource and delay. The efficiency and robustness of the proposed scheme are encouraging.
Introduction
With the development of semiconductor technology, it is possible to integrate multiple predesigned components in a chip. The use of these components, known as intellectual property cores (IPs), has enormous advantages. It offers fast development of a complex system and reduces time to market [1] [7] . Meanwhile, the design risk is much lower. Due to these advantages, this technology is prevalent in implementation of complex integrated circuits. But, these IP cores face the issue of being stolen or sold illegally. It may cause great economic damage to the owner of IPs. Therefore, researchers attempt to propose methods to protect these reused IP cores.
By analyzing the reported technologies, there are three kinds of IP protection approaches, i.e., patenting, encryption and watermarking [12] . The use of patenting is a deterrent method to stop attempts for illegal distribution. Encryption has ability to prevent unauthorized use of IP, which belongs to protective method. However, these two technologies have no substantial physical protection to IP itself. Comparatively, digital watermarking is more effective in IP protection. It usually hosts a signature into IP design to declare the copyright or trace infringement [22] [34] . Illegal use of IPs could be detected and traced by the embedded signature. IP watermarking based protection is different from privacy protection of multimedia or sensitive data in network [20] , because the functional correctness must be preserved. Once piracy is suspected, legal IP owner can apply to verify the suspected IP design, the overview of IP watermarking is shown in Fig.1 . Successful detection of a valid signature proves the ownership of IP core. 
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Fig. 1. Overview of IP watermarking
This work is organized as follows. Section 2 classifies existing IP watermarking methods and analyzes their performances. Section 3 gives an overview of the robust low overhead watermarking algorithm. The detailed watermarking algorithm, including watermark preparation, configuration, verification, is introduced in section 4. The experimental results are illustrated and compared in section 5. Section 6 summarizes this work.
Related Work
The watermarked IP propagates in semiconductor market instead of the original one. The case is the same to IPs in application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), field programmable gate array (FPGA), etc. But the implementations of watermarks are various in each platform. In recent years, FPGA becomes a prevailing platform due to the reprogrammable feature. The watermarking algorithms for protection of FPGA-based IPs are widely studied. These algorithms are classified into two groups: constraints-based watermarking and additive watermarking [33] . Constraints-based watermarking methods in FPGA mainly place extra constraints for configurable logic blocks (CLBs) in odd/even rows [11] , restrict the timing of uncritical path [10] , exploit the scan chains [9] [8] [4] or preserve nets during the procedure of logic synthesis [13] . Other additive methods usually add a signature into the functional IP core. The use of lookup tables is typical in this type of watermarking. For FPGA design, the Xilinx ISE is a common tool with lots of small tools integrated. The synthesis tool usually maps the combinational logic of a design into lookup tables of FPGA and writes the values into netlist of IP design. The content of lookup tables is known after synthesis. It can be parsed and read from the bitfile with Jbits [27] . By considering this, the watermarks can be also realized in this way. If a company is accused to use an unlicensed IP core in a product, the bitfile will be extracted. According to each watermark positions, the ownership verifier can successfully read out the watermark content and construct a signature. If it is consistent with the declared signature, the ownership of IP core can be proven.
These are effective methods and easy to implement. But large overhead is caused by watermark insertion, especially for the additive methods. Furthermore, the major weakness is lack of robust verification of watermarks from an accused product. For this type of methods, the watermarks are always detected in configuration bitstream of FPGA, which is the most vulnerable to attacks [32] . There are several types of attacks. (1) Cloning. If the bitfile is in plaintext, it can be directly cloned and implemented on other FPGA chips.
(2) Tampering. The bitfile can be altered to leak confidential information. The watermarks are also under this type of threat. (3) Physical attacks. The FPGA device may be tampered to realize a desired fault. The sensitive information is extracted by analyzing the correct and fault outputs. Or vicious user uses some sophisticated tools to probe inner structure of the chip and to learn information of the design. In addition, the side-channel information of a design, such as power, computation time, may be illegally used to infer the design secrets. As the watermarks are inserted into design like other configuration data, these attacks should all be considered and addressed to make the watermarks robust. No matter where the watermarks are implemented (HDL level [3] [16] . There are several ECCs in information security, e.g., hamming code, cyclic code, parity-check code and reed-solomon code. It can make the watermarks resilient to tampering. But the redundancy caused by check codes has limited the ability of correcting since the author should make a compromise between overhead and robustness.
We consider this issue and propose robust low-overhead watermarking technique for protection of FPGA-based IP design. The contributions are stated as follows.
(1) The ownership information is split into a set of orderly watermarks. So, it is unnecessary to consider the order of extract watermarks.
(2) The watermarks are effectively compressed and inserted into design. The watermarks are indicated with information of locations and contents of lookup tables. So, it frees more space for enhancing the error correcting ability. The experiments show the overhead is much lower than that of previous techniques.
(3) The tampering can be located and corrected. It achieves fast location of tampering attacks. The compression based insertion offers great improvements on correcting ability. The experimental results illustrate the effectiveness.
An Overview of Robust Low-overhead Watermarking
The mathematical definition of the proposed technique can be described as follows. Let ip and ip w be original marked IPs. G is the function to generate watermarks. s represents the ownership information of IP owner. κ 1 and κ 2 denote the keys for watermark generation and embedding. w and E(ip, w, κ 2 ) represent watermark and function of watermark insertion. s, κ 1 , κ 2 are kept as privacy. w is encoded as ζ(w).
With these notations, we have G(s, κ 1 ) → w, E w (ip, w, κ 2 ) → ip w . G maps s into w under the control of κ 1 . The function E w (ip, w, κ 2 ) inserts w into ip. So, ip w is generated.
The set I ip includes all acceptable sequences. The output of any input i ∈ I ip is denoted by O ip (i). E w should make ∀i ∈ I ip , I ip = I ipw and O ip = O ipw . IP circuit has high requirement on functional correctness, which cannot be altered. ip w will propagate in semiconductor market instead of ip. If user A integrates and unauthorized in his product p, IP owner can apply to check s from p. He needs to detect ζ(w ) in p with the reserved κ 2 . A check function T (ζ(w )) is designed to check correctness of w . If T (ζ(w )) = 1, w is equal to w. Otherwise, it is tampered. The self-correcting procedure is activated. Under the control of κ 1 , we have D w (w , κ 1 ) → s . Let S i and F i respectively denote "success" and "failure" of checking a watermark at location i. ∩ 
Mappting function f(x)
Reversible function g(x) Fig. 2 . Overview of the proposed technique Fig.2 shows an overview of the proposed solution. The ownership information is transformed into a watermark value. It will be split into multiple small watermark values with a mapping function. The encoded split values are then used to generate the watermark positions and real contents of watermarks. The location mapping is performed to cover up real positions of watermarks. In verification, if the ownership information is successfully detected, the ownership will be proven.
Detailed Watermarking Scheme
In this section, we divide the proposed technique into three parts by considering the flow of digital watermarking, i.e., preparation, configuration and verification.
Watermark Preparation and Configuration
For watermark preparation in actual application, the IP owner hopes to insert some meaningful information into IP design, such as his own signature. However, the circuit can only accept the digits of "0" and "1". So, the first thing is to transform the information into digits. A large value can be decomposed into multiple small values by using a mapping function. Let W be the large number. n is the number of split values, i.e., granularity of decomposition. {W 1 , W 2 , ..., W n } is a set of split values. f (x) represents the mapping function. It is used to split W into {W 1 , W 2 , ..., W n } . So, it is a one-to-many function. However, the reversible function g(x) is many-to-one and can be used to recreate W . In this section, we divide this procedure into the following steps.
Orderly Watermark Splitting Let s be a string representing public ownership information (such as company name, brand) of IP owner and H s be a function to transform s into a value v w . The goal of this mechanism is to split w into a set of n orderly watermark values, n ≥ 2. Empirically, the value of n is determined between 5 and 15 [6] . Concretely, there are three steps to get the final watermarks.
The transformation function H s first transforms s into a bitstring s bs . It can be represented by ASCII codes and then transformed into a value w. No encryption technique is used in this step. Once adversary finds the correct locations of watermarks, he will possibly remove the watermarks other than infer the ownership information. The watermark value is split into multiple small values as follows.
1. Compute the minimum exponent λ such that the value v w can be denoted using n − 1 digits of base 2 λ . The value of 2 λ cannot exceed the value of n − 1. So, we have (1).
Here, N is the length of bitstring of v w . 2. Split the value v w into digits v w 0 , v w 1 , ..., v w n−2 such that v w i ∈ [0, 2 λ ) and the following formula (2) is satisfied.
3. Encode the digits in the multiset {w 0 , w 1 , ..., w n−1 } where w 0 = λ − 1 and w i = w i−1 + v wi−1 .
For example, we split a watermark value of 3749523692 with =12. The bitstring is "1101111101111101001100001110110" with length of 32. So, we calculate the minimum exponent using λ = N/(n − 1) = 3. This produces a list of 3,3,7,3,7,2,3,0,3,5,4 and finally the multiset 2, 5, 8, 15, 18, 25, 27, 30, 30, 33, 38 ,42 on basis of step 3. The base number of 2 can be extended to m.
The elements of multiset w 0 , w 1 , ..., w n−1 will be classified into two subsets: P w and C w . Assume k is the number of elements in C w . Elements p w0 , p w1 , ..., p w n−k−1 in P w are not real embedded watermarks, just watermark indications, or namely, watermark locations. Differently, the proposed technique generates watermark locations from watermarks themselves. And C w contains the physically contents of configured watermarks c w0 , c w1 , ..., c w k . The elements of P w and C w are sensitive information. So, we map P w to another P w to cover up the real locations. Elements in C w as real contents of configuration watermarks, will be further encoded by encoding function ζ(c wi
Location mapping The set P w contains real watermark positions and C w includes contents of configuration watermarks. The elements in P w are orderly divided by pairs and each pair (p wi , p wi+1 ) denotes a coordinate of watermark location, i ∈ [0, n − k − 1]. k is the number of watermark positions. We represent the coordinate with (x i , y i ) to make it clear. To cover up the sensitive positions, we have a location mapping M p : (p wi , p wi+1 ) → (p wi , p wi+1 ). Actually, the contents of watermarks are still in (p wi , p wi+1 ). We define M p as p wi = p wi +ζ(c wi ), p wi+1 = ζ(c wi )−p wi+1 . So, the mapped positions are kept as privacy. In verification, the IP verifier can calculate real positions (p wi , p wi+1 ) with (p wi , p wi+1 ) and contents of ζ(c wi ). In this case, (p wi , p wi+1 ) will not be leaked in verification.
Configuration The encoded ζ(c wi ), i ∈ [0, k − 1], is placed into (p wi , p wi+1 ) by configuring as a logic function F c . In bitfile, F c can be represented by a configuration data Dc , which has no differences with that of the functional one. Furthermore, the mapped (p wi , p wi+1 ), i ∈ [0, n − k − 1], is kept by IP owner as an evidence in verification.
We summarize this procedure in the following pseudo-codes. Watermark Embedding(s,ip){ Compute v w = H s (s);// H s (s) is the transforming function Set the default value n;// the number of split values Compute the minimum exponent of base
Compute w i = w i − 1 + v wi ; End Divide into P w and C w ; For each pair in P w Map (p wi , p wi+1 ) to (p wi , p wi+1 ) ;//location mapping End For each element in C w Perform encoding ζ(c wi ) ; Configure ζ(c wi ) into (p wi , p wi+1 ) ; End Return ip w ; }
Watermark Verification
In the market of IP trading, vicious users may intentionally crack, copy or forge an IP for his illegal purpose. All these behaviors will bring losses to IP owner, both in economics and efforts. If the unauthorized IP is used in a product, IP owner could buy such a product and verify whether containing his ownership information. The verification procedure requires nothing else from the company of the suspected product, i.e., it is blind detection. IP owner is almost impossible to detect the ownership information s in the accused product if ip w not exists actually. Otherwise, IP owner could verify s as follows.
In fact, IP owner knows the information about (p wi , p wi+1 ) ,i ∈ [0, k − 1]. However, he will use (p wi , p wi+1 ) to verify the watermarks since it will not reveal the actual positions with watermarks. The verification algorithm will locate the watermarks with (p wi , p wi+1 ) and the reserved information. The configuration data Dc is read out, which relates to the encoded blocks ζ(c wi ), ∈ [0, k − 1]. During this procedure, the derived (p wi , p wi+1 ) should be recorded for reconstructing a final ownership information s 
Experimental Results
The experiments implement the proposed scheme in circuits from IWLS 2005 and IS-CAS89. The implementation uses Xilinx Virtex II Pro FPGA [26] . In this section, we aim to verify overhead, efficiency of watermark embedding, and robustness. All the experiments are performed on a machine with 3.4GHz Intel(R) core(TM) i3 CPU and 4G memories.
Overhead Evaluation
We evaluate the overhead in resource and delay using the metrics in [30] . The resource is measured by the usage of LUTs and delay is evaluated by the minimum clock cycle. The evaluation is implemented on circuit ethernet . The bistring with length of 192 is inserted into ethernet after preparation. The evaluation data is summarized in Table 1 . The results show the resource and delay overhead is 0.166% and 0%. The average resource overhead caused by each watermark is 0.011%, which is much lower. We compare the resource overhead with methods in [24] and [18] . Fig.3 describes the comparing results. The usage of LUT in [24] increases linearly since the watermarks are generated by directly dividing. The method in [18] has large overhead increase when the bitstring is less, more than that of [24] . But with the increase of bistring, it causes less increase than [24] . Our scheme obviously causes lower resource of LUT than the comparative methods.
Efficiency of Watermark Embedding
We use the rate of watermark embedding in [28] in evaluation. This metric indicates the ratio of real embedded watermarks which cause impact on overhead in all watermarks. 
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O u r M e t h o d S a h a ' s M e t h o d L i a n g ' s M e t h o d Fig. 3 . Compare the usage of LUTs to the methods in [24] and [18] Let L s be the number of bitstring s bs . The minimum groups of s bs should be N g = L s /L(max{Dc}) in order to successfully embed s bs . L(max{Dc}) is the length of the maximum value of Dc. n is the number of splitting values.
In the proposed technique, we split a large watermark value into n multiple small values. The number of watermarks is extended to n times of the original one. But the compressed watermark embedding divides the n watermarks into groups by three units. In each group, there is only one real embedded watermark. So, the number of real watermarks N w in ip w is n/3. Due to the constraint on n , it will not increase with L s . Fatherly, we define the rate of watermark compression r w to evaluate the embedded bitstring, denoted as equation (3).
Generally, r w is expected to be less than 1 since it indicates less extra resource overhead. But it cannot be overly small and the embedded watermarks should provide enough credibility as court evidence. If L s is a constant, the smaller value of n achieves a lower rate of watermark embedding. Table 2 . We verify the efficiency when "L s " has the length of "32", "64", "96", "128", "160" and "192". N w is the number of actual inserted contents. r w is the rate of watermark embedding. The next column shows the increase of lookup tables in marked circuits. We insert bitstring with various length on basis of the circuit scale. The value of r w is almost less than "1" except the result of "s9234 1". It demonstrates that the proposed scheme performs well on embedding efficiency. Namely, more ownership information can be indicated using the proposed scheme if the extra overhead is constant. The value of "1.5" illustrates an expansion of watermarks. Actually, it causes a redundancy. But the results show r w decreases with the increase of watermark bitstring. We compare the efficiency of watermark embedding of our method with that of methods in [24] and [18] . Each lookup table in the given devices can store 16 bits at most [33] . The method in [24] divides the bistring by the maximum stored number. The method of [18] shares the watermark into multiple values by using threshold theory. The real embedded bitstring is compressed but the number of watermark blocks is not reduced. The results are shown in Fig.4 . The rate of watermark embedding is unchanged and keeps a value of "1" in [24] . Because all the watermarks groups are inserted into design. On basis of equation (3), the value of is always "1". While in [18] , the sharing method actually expands the inserted contents when the length of watermark bitstring is almost less than 112 bits. When the bistring exceeds the value, the rate of watermark embedding decreases below "1". The reason is caused by limitation of threshold value. In our method, the rate of watermark embedding shows a downtrend and the watermark expansion occurs when the watermark bistring is less than nearly 48. With the growth of bistring, it is much less than that of method in [18] . In this view, we could indicate more contents of ownership information when the caused resource overhead is the same to that in comparative methods.
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Watermark Strength and Robustness
In this section, we aim to evaluate watermark strength and robustness against tampering attacks. r f is the key metric to verify the strength of a watermarking method. It can be evaluated by using equation (4) .
k and m denote the number of inserted watermarks and the usage of LUT, respectively. C k m represents the number of possible permutations to get the correct watermark positions. The evaluation of watermark strength is shown in Table 3 . The robustness against attacks is measured by r c .The experiment is conducted on circuit ethernet with Xilinx xc2vp7-6fg456 FPGA. The damage rate r d caused by attacks and the rate of correct detection r c are evaluated and the result is shown in Fig.5 . Fig.5 (a) shows the curves in both methods are uptrend. The proposed method has suffered less damage from the attacks. The rate of correct detection is evaluated under the damage rate in (a). When the damage rate is less, both the methods show a high rate of correct detection, as shown in Fig.5 (b) . With the growth of watermark bitstring, the curve in method [24] shows a sharp downtrend. But the curve in our method is gentler. The reason is analyzed that the compression frees more space for correcting, which brings better performance on rate of correct detection. By comparing, it is superior to that of the method in [24] .
Conclusions
In this work, we present a low-overhead watermarking technique by compressing real inserted contents of watermarks. The ownership information is split into multiple orderly small values. One part of watermarks is regarded as watermark locations and the remaining is real embedded watermarks. To enhance the ability against attacks, the real embedded contents will be further encoded to enhance the correcting ability. Only the later watermarks may affect the performance of IP design. The compressed mechanism frees more space to enhance the correcting ability. Orderly watermarks are helpful to watermark reconstruction, not considering the out-of-order problem. The experiments show the physical resource overhead decreases by 2/3 and the ability against tampering is encouraging.
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